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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
 Plaintiffs ask this Court to step beyond the proper role of the Judiciary, to proceed 
without subject-matter jurisdiction, to ignore the explicit command of the Anti-Injunction Act, 
and to devise sweeping new constitutional rules to strike down the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).  The irreducible prerequisite for plaintiffs to assert a claim in 
federal court is standing, and the irreducible prerequisite to standing is injury.  Yet plaintiffs can 
allege none, because, as the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found as to 
similar claims, “it is impossible to know now whether or not Plaintiff[s] will be subject to or 
compliant with the Act in 2014,” when it goes into effect.  Baldwin v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 3:10-cv-
01033, Dkt. No. 37, at 5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010).  The Anti-Injunction Act bars any suit “for 
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.”  Yet plaintiffs seek to prevent 
the collection of the tax penalty imposed under the minimum coverage provision.  The 
established tests under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause defer to 
Congress’s judgment that a provision regulates matters substantially affecting interstate 
commerce, or is integral to a larger regulation of interstate commerce.  Yet plaintiffs ask the 
Court to ignore Congress’s judgment on these matters in favor of their own policy views.  And 
the well-worn touchstone of congressional taxing power under the General Welfare Clause is 
whether the provision produces revenue.  Yet plaintiffs revive a distinction between regulatory 
and revenue-raising taxes which the Supreme Court used in the 1920’s to strike down the child 
labor laws and which it has long since “abandoned.”  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 
741 n.12 (1974).   
 Plaintiffs’ as-applied RFRA challenges are no more substantial.  Plaintiffs’ allegation of a 
“conflict” between government action and religious belief does not state a claim under RFRA, 
particularly when plaintiffs fail to explain the importance of their alleged belief to their religious 
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scheme or indicate whether they would be unable to qualify for one of the Act’s religious 
exemptions.   
 In Gulf Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2010 
WL 3184327 at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2010), this Court rejected speculative allegations of adverse 
effects that “‘may’ occur at some point in the future,” finding that the limitations of Article III 
preclude consideration of such claims.  Plaintiffs’ claims here are at least as premature and 
speculative, and cannot draw an Article III Court into a policy dispute regarding the legislative 
judgments Congress reached in addressing a spiraling healthcare crisis. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE OPERATION OF THE 
 MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IN 2014 
 
 Plaintiffs concede, as they must, that the minimum coverage provision of the ACA will 
not take effect until 2014.  See also Order on Defs.’ Mot. to Stay, Dkt. No. 20, at 2 (“It should be 
noted that the ACA will not go into effect until 2014.”).  In Gulf Restoration Network, this Court 
noted the D.C. Circuit’s repeated conclusion that “an injury is not ‘actual, imminent, or ‘certainly 
impending’’ for standing purposes where a party ‘can only aver that any significant adverse 
effects . . . ‘may’ occur at some point in the future.’”  2010 WL 3184327 at *8 (quoting Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C.Cir.2009)); id. (“Plaintiffs’ 
claims in the instant case are equally general and attenuated since they describe possible future 
harms instead of concrete present injury.”); see also Pub. Citizen v. NHTSA, 489 F.3d 1279, 
1298 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Plaintiffs’ allegations of future injury from the operation of the minimum 
coverage provision in 2014 therefore do not establish the type of injury that satisfies the 
requirements of Article III.   
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 Resorting to the case law of prudential ripeness1
                                                          
1 Rather than address the imminence requirement of Article III head on, plaintiffs conflate the 
discussion with their analysis of ripeness.  See Opp. at 4-11.  As this Court has explained, 
ripeness shares a constitutional element with Article III, in that both require a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that he or she has suffered “present or imminent injury in fact.”  Gulf Restoration 
Network, 2010 WL 3184327 at *10-11.  However, prudential ripeness concerns go beyond the 
requirements of Article III to permit a court to evaluate the “fitness of the issue for judicial 
decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”  Id. at 11.  It is 
these prudential concerns on which plaintiffs focus in their Opposition, and which the cases they 
cite address.  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) (analyzing prudential factors); Riva v. Commonwealth of Mass., 61 F.3d 1003 
(1st Cir. 1995) (same); Triple G Landfills Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Fountain Cnty., Indiana, 977 
F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).  Even assuming plaintiffs could demonstrate that these 
prudential factors weigh against postponing judicial review, they still would have to meet the 
bedrock demands of Article III before these factors would be at issue.  
, plaintiffs first assert that “they are 
compelled to adjust their financial affairs now to prepare” for 2014.  Opp. at 4-5.  It is clear that 
such “injury” does not satisfy the requirements of Article III.  Plaintiffs allege only that they 
have chosen to allocate their money differently than in the past.  Whether that means that they 
have shifted the amount of the penalty that they anticipate paying in 2014 from checking to 
savings, or began investing in stocks rather than bonds, the fact remains that these funds remain 
theirs until at least 2014.  Plaintiffs’ financial planning on account of the supposed financial 
uncertainty that they face simply does not establish imminent injury or current hardship.  See, 
e.g., Sanner v. Bd. of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have little difficulty 
concluding that the soybean farmers who refrained from selling soybeans due to the depressed 
price of the cash market lack standing under Article III.”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. 
United States, 104 F.Supp.2d 58, 68 (D.D.C. 2000) (possible future diminution in salary and 
benefits from government action was insufficient to establish injury-in-fact).  To hold otherwise 
would do away with the requirement of imminent harm.  A plaintiff with a 10 percent chance of 
incurring a liability in five years could allege standing now based on the need to prepare for that 
financial contingency.  It is thus not surprising that this Court, and others, have routinely found 
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allegations of “financial planning” inadequate to justify review even in the prudential ripeness 
context.  See, e.g., Gulf Restoration Network, 2010 WL 3184327 at *13 (rejecting plaintiffs’ 
argument that they are suffering current hardship “because ‘they are subject to regulation under 
the Gulf FMP and must change their own behavior to avoid aquaculture sites’”); see also, e.g., 
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 736 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The planning insecurity 
Tennessee advances does not set its case apart from the mine run of situations . . . .”); Wilmac 
Corp. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 809, 813 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Mere economic uncertainty affecting the 
[plaintiffs’] planning is not sufficient to support premature review.”). 
 Moreover, even if plaintiffs’ allegation of an “adjustment of financial affairs” could 
constitute injury in fact, such an injury would be entirely of plaintiffs’ own making.  Plaintiffs 
here retain control over their finances.  Accordingly, unlike cases plaintiffs cite such as Triple G, 
where government action rendered useless funds already spent, plaintiffs are the ones who have 
chosen to allocate their funds in the manner about which they now complain.  Such an injury is 
not traceable to the operation of the minimum coverage provision.  See, e.g., Nat’l Family 
Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The 
supposed dilemma is particularly chimerical here because the association’s asserted injury 
appears to be largely of its own making.”); Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. 
BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Council and its programs would 
have been totally unaffected if it had simply refrained from making the re-allocation.”). 
 Plaintiffs next assert that there is a “substantial probability that Plaintiffs will be required 
to pay thousands of dollars to the government in penalties” when the minimum coverage 
provision goes into effect.  Opp. at 10.  Putting aside the undisputed fact that, as in McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 226 (2003), this “substantial probability” of injury results from the operation 
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of a statute years in the future, it is untrue that such a probability necessarily exists on the face of 
the Complaint.  As an initial matter, plaintiffs have no good answer to defendants’ argument that 
it is entirely speculative whether they would even be subject to a penalty if they were to choose 
not to purchase insurance in 2014.2  In fact, as characterized in their Opposition, plaintiffs allege 
only that they would be subject to the minimum coverage provision if it “were effective 
immediately,” and that the provision will apply to plaintiffs “for the indefinite future.” Opp. at 4 
(emphasis added).  Of course whether the provision would apply to plaintiffs if it were effective 
now and whether it would continue to apply for some uncertain duration says nothing about 
whether the provision will injure them in 2014 or any other time thereafter.  That fact, as the 
Court found in Baldwin, is unknowable (and even unlikely), as plaintiffs do not dispute that 
plaintiff Mead will be on Medicare by 2014 which puts her in compliance with the provision, 
Opp. at 4 n.4, and that the remaining plaintiffs might, by 2014, find employment that provides 
adequate health coverage, discover that their economic situation has deteriorated to the point 
where they qualify for Medicaid or a financial exemption, see Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b) 
(adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)), or change their minds about the necessity of health insurance 
due to such possible life events as a serious illness.3
                                                          
2 In both Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 146 (1974), and Pacific Gas, 
on which plaintiffs rely, the Supreme Court refused to consider claims that depended on 
contingencies that rendered future harm speculative.  For example, in Pacific Gas the Supreme 
Court rejected a challenge to one section of the act in question because “we cannot know 
whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear plant’s storage capacity to be 
inadequate.”  461 U.S. at 203 (internal quotation omitted).  Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 
406 U.S. 498, 506-07 (1972), is also inapposite.  The Court reached the merits of plaintiffs’ 
challenge there because the law in question may have presently “conflict[ed] with other state 
regulations pending the promulgation and effective date of the federal standards.”   
  After all, three of the remaining four 
 
3 Nor is religious objection somehow a bridge over the speculation inherent in plaintiffs’ 
allegations of future injury.  Plaintiffs do not dispute that, consistent with their alleged religious 
beliefs, they could join a group that qualifies for a religious exemption, qualify for a financial 
hardship exemption, or qualify and choose to take advantage of Medicaid benefits to pay for 
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plaintiffs admit that at some point in their lives—even as recently as five years ago—they had 
health insurance.  See Compl. ¶¶ 28, 40, 54, 66.   
 For these very reasons, the District Court in Baldwin dismissed a lawsuit brought by an 
individual challenging the minimum coverage provision, because “it is impossible to know now 
whether or not Plaintiff will be subject to or compliant with the Act in 2014.”4
II. PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGES ARE NOT RIPE 
  Baldwin, Civ. 
No. 3:10-cv-01033, Dkt. No. 37, at 5.  This Court, too, should reject plaintiffs’ attempt to rush to 
a constitutional judgment on a critical provision of the health reform legislation years before its 
effective date. 
 The Court should also dismiss the Complaint because it is not ripe for review.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Treasury Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  As the D.C. 
Circuit has held, “Article III courts should not make decisions unless they have to,” id., 
particularly when a case challenges the constitutionality of a federal statute, Metzenbaum v. 
FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).  In balancing the harms to the 
respective parties in Gulf Restoration Network, this Court recognized the importance of the 
ripeness inquiry in Article III courts, as well as its intrinsic role in assessing the balance of 
harms:  “[p]laintiffs can bring their suit at a later time, after harm is more imminent and more 
certain.  Deferring consideration of the dispute until that point serves important interests both in 
avoiding interfer[ence] with the system that Congress specified . . ., and in judicial economy.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
services provided by religious nonmedical healthcare institutions.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to 
Dismiss at 12 n.5. 
 
4 The directly analogous claims in Baldwin provide a stark contrast with plaintiffs’ strained 
attempt to invoke the decision of the district court in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, Case 
No. 3:10-cv-188 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010).  See Opp. at 7.  That case dealt only with the standing 
of Virginia to sue, not the alleged injuries of individual plaintiffs from the operation of a statute 
years in the future. 
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2010 WL 3184327 at *14 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  For despite plaintiffs’ 
assertion that “‘they are subject to regulation . . . and must change their own behavior . . .,’ 
[p]laintiffs cannot establish that delaying suit would be sufficiently disadvantageous to their case 
because as of yet, they are ‘not required to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct.’”  Id. at 
*13 (internal citation omitted).  Accordingly, judicial review should be deferred until the point at 
which this Court is able to determine whether the harms alleged are actually “imminent or more 
certain.”  Id. at *14 (internal quotation omitted).   
III. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT BARS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS 
 As discussed in defendants’ opening brief, plaintiffs’ claim, if successful, would enjoin 
the government from collecting the penalty set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) and is therefore 
barred by the AIA, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).  To evade this statutory bar, plaintiffs claim to challenge 
only the requirement to obtain insurance, set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), and not the penalty 
set forth in § 5000A(b).  Opp. at 41; but see Opp. at 30 (arguing that Congress linked the 
minimum coverage provision and the penalty such that the penalty would become “meaningless 
and unenforceable” if the requirement were invalidated).   
 The plain statutory language of the AIA defeats this argument.  However plaintiffs 
characterize their claim, the simple fact is that if they win the order they seek—“a permanent 
injunction against the enforcement of the individual mandate provisions contained in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Am. Compl. at 26—the government will be barred from 
collecting the penalty under the minimum coverage provision.  The AIA expressly precludes any 
suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.”  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).  
This includes any suit that, if successful, would restrain government activities “‘which are 
intended to, or may culminate in the assessment of taxes.’”  Yamaha Motor Corp. v. United 
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States, 779 F. Supp. 610, 613 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting Smith v. Rich, 667 F.2d 1228, 1230 (5th 
Cir.1982)); accord Church of Scientology v. United States, 920 F.2d 1481, 1486 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing that “[t]o hold otherwise would enable ingenious counsel to so frame complaints as 
to frustrate the policy or purpose behind the [AIA]”) (internal quotation omitted).  Here, the 
minimum coverage provision “may culminate in the assessment of taxes,” Yamaha, 779 F. Supp. 
at 613, and enjoining the provision necessarily restrains that assessment.  In short, plaintiffs’ 
“frequent reiteration that this is a non-tax suit does not make it so.”  Graham v. United States, 
573 F. Supp. 848, 850 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 Plaintiffs also appear to suggest that the AIA does not apply because individuals who 
choose to comply would be left “without an effective remedy.”  Opp. at 41.  However, the 
relevant exception, as set forth in South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984), applies only 
where Congress “has not provided an alternative remedy.”  Id. at 378.  Plaintiffs here have an 
alternative remedy, a refund suit.  That some people will choose to purchase insurance rather 
than paying the penalty and then filing suit does not render the remedy inadequate.  See 
Alexander v. Americans United, 416 U.S. 752, 762 (1974); Ross v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 
2d 139, 148 & n.5 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 Finally, plaintiffs assert throughout their Opposition that the AIA is not implicated where 
there is no “current assessment or collection of any tax” or any tax “alleged to be currently or 
past due.”  Opp. at 42-45.  This argument that the AIA should not apply here because of the lack 
of imminent injury or a ripe claim given the 2014 effective date of the minimum coverage 
provision,  see, e.g., id. at 42, 44, collides with plaintiffs’ argument elsewhere that they have 
suffered imminent injury and that their claim is ripe.  They cannot have it both ways.  Moreover, 
this argument ignores the broad language and purpose of the AIA, which focuses on the effect of 
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the relief sought.  Thus, in Bob Jones, the Supreme Court held that the AIA barred a plaintiff 
from challenging the revocation of its non-profit status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code—a decision that primarily affected the collection of revenues from third-parties 
who might choose in the future to contribute to plaintiff.  See 416 U.S. at 738-39; see also 
Alexander, 416 U.S. at 760-61 (“The obvious purpose of respondent’s action was to restore 
advance assurance that donations to it would qualify as charitable deductions under § 170 that 
would reduce the level of taxes of its donors.”) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs here would restrain 
the collection of revenues more directly, and the AIA bars their effort to do so.  
IV. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
 A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s   
  Commerce Power 
 
 If this Court reaches the merits of plaintiffs’ challenge to the minimum coverage 
provision, it should dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Congress acted within its broad power 
under the Commerce Clause in including the minimum coverage provision as part of 
comprehensive health reform legislation.  Under well-established Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, Congress’s commerce power includes the power to regulate even noncommercial 
intrastate activity where doing so is essential to a broader regulatory scheme, such as the ACA’s 
broad scheme designed to increase the affordability and availability of health care.  Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).  Congress may also regulate economic decisions—including the 
decision whether to finance future health care costs through insurance or to attempt to pay for 
them out-of-pocket as they arise—where it determines that those decisions, in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce.  Id. at 17.  Congress’s judgments on these matters are 
“entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”  Id. at 28. 
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 Specifically, as discussed in defendants’ opening brief, Congress determined that the 
minimum coverage provision is essential to the ACA’s other insurance market reforms, which, 
among other things, bar insurance companies from refusing to cover, or charging higher 
premiums to, individuals because of pre-existing medical conditions.  Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 
1201.  Those reforms are intended to regulate interstate markets by eliminating practices that 
unfairly burden consumers and restrict the availability and affordability of health insurance and, 
as a result, health care.  Yet, without the minimum coverage provision, Congress determined, 
these reforms would not work.  Instead, they would amplify incentives of individuals to forgo 
insurance until they become sick or injured.  Id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a).  This would result in 
a smaller insurance risk pool, which would accelerate the current upward spiral of health care 
and health insurance costs.  Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 118-19 (Apr. 22, 2009) (Am. 
Academy of Actuaries).  Thus, Congress found the minimum coverage provision “essential” to 
its broader effort through the ACA to increase the availability and affordability of health care.  
Pub. L. No. 111-148 §§ 1501(a)(2)(C), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), 10106(a). 
 In addition, Congress determined that individual decisions about whether to pay for 
health care services through insurance, or attempt to pay later out of pocket, have an aggregate 
effect of shifting billions of dollars in costs to governments, health care providers, insurance 
companies, and insured individuals.  See id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a) (finding that this cost 
rose to $43 billion in 2008).  Congress found that such individual decision-making, when 
considered against the backdrop of federal laws effectively guaranteeing emergency screening 
and stabilization regardless of ability to pay, not only “increases financial risks to households 
and medical providers” on an individual basis, id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 10106(a), but also on the 
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whole substantially affects the interstate markets in health care and health insurance, id. §§ 
1501(a)(2)(E)-(G), 10106(a). 
 In arguing that the provision exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers, plaintiffs not only 
misread the four seminal Supreme Court cases concerning the Commerce Clause, but also 
largely ignore how the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has interpreted those cases.5
 Here too plaintiffs badly misread the case law and compound the error by asserting that 
the minimum coverage provision is unconstitutional because “[l]awful presence in the United 
States, without more, is not an economic class of activities akin to the production and 
distribution of a marketable commodity.”  Id. at 23.  Even if economic or commercial activity 
were in fact a prerequisite of regulation under the Commerce Clause, the ACA would plainly 
satisfy it.  Far from regulating mere “presence in the United States,” the Act instead regulates a 
vast interstate market consuming an estimated 17.6 percent of our gross domestic product, Pub. 
  Thus, 
plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison allow Congress to 
regulate only “a commercial or economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.”  
Opp. at 16, 19, 20.  The D.C. Circuit, however, has explicitly addressed and rejected the 
argument that Congress may regulate only conduct that is itself economic or commercial in 
nature.  In Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Court of 
Appeals held that plaintiffs had “badly misread” the Court’s decision in Lopez in making such an 
argument, as a “close examination of Lopez reveals that it supports” the Circuit’s prior holding 
that “a ‘regulated activity . . . need not be commercial, so long as its effect on interstate 
commerce is substantial.’”  Id. (quoting Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).   
                                                          
5 Of course, as defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss demonstrates, 
defendants disagree with plaintiffs’ characterization of the Court’s holdings in these cases and 
their effect on the present litigation.  See Mem. in Supp. at 17-19. 
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L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(B), 10106(a)—a market that Congress has authority to regulate, 
see United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).   Section 1501, like the 
Act as a whole, regulates decisions about how to pay for services in the health care market—a 
market in which virtually everyone participates.  These decisions are quintessentially economic, 
and within the traditional scope of the Commerce Clause.  As Congress recognized, “decisions 
about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased” are 
“economic and financial” and thus “commercial and economic in nature.”  Pub. L. No. 111-148 
§§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 10106(a).  In addition, these decisions have substantial effects on interstate 
commerce, as it is undisputed that care for uninsured individuals cost $43 billion in 2008, or 
about 5 percent of overall hospital revenues.  See CBO, 2008 Key Issues in Analyzing Major 
Health Proposals 114 (Dec. 2008); Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a).   
 Plaintiffs also contend that the “Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to 
‘regulate’ inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service (such as health insurance) 
as a condition of their lawful residence in the United States.”  Opp. at 12.  As defendants 
explained in their Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs misunderstand 
both the nature of the regulated activity and the scope of Congress’s power.  Individuals who 
make the economic choice to finance their medical needs without insurance have not opted out 
of the health care market.  Individuals constantly make economic decisions as to whether to 
finance their medical needs through insurance, or to attempt to do so out-of-pocket with the 
backstop of free emergency room care.  Indeed, a substantial majority of those without insurance 
coverage at any point in time in fact move in and out of coverage, and have had coverage at 
some point within the same year.  CBO, How Many Lack Health Insurance and For How Long?, 
at 4, 9 (May 2003); see also CBO, Key Issues at 11.  The decision whether to purchase health 
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 23    Filed 09/24/10   Page 19 of 33
13 
insurance on the open market is accordingly an active economic decision about how to finance 
health care consumption during a particular time period.6
Even if plaintiffs were correct in describing these economic decisions as “inactivity”—
which they are not—regulating them would not be beyond the bounds of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority so long as Congress determined the inactivity substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Courts have rejected, for example, challenges to the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 228(a), which affirmatively requires child support payments in interstate commerce.  
See, e.g., United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim that the Act 
exceeds the commerce power “because it concerns not the sending of money interstate but the 
failure to send money”); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause 
by regulating his “inaction within California”).  And Congress may regulate the “failure to 
register” as a sex offender pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
 
7
Also, despite plaintiffs’ “first time in our Nation’s history” hyperbole, Opp. at 24, it is 
also well-settled that Congress may require private parties to enter into insurance contracts where 
  See United States v. Gould, 568 
F.3d 459, 471-72 (4th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases upholding the constitutionality of SORNA).   
                                                          
6 Plaintiffs’ criticism of defendants’ analogy to a method of payment for services is a non 
sequitur.  Plaintiffs suggest that the minimum coverage provision cannot be compared to the 
regulation of the choice between paying for something by credit card or check because “[a]n 
insured person is still responsible to pay deductibles” and other costs.  Opp. at 24 n.14.  This 
objection is irrelevant.  With a credit card, an individual faces interest payments that can add 
later costs to the purchase price.  That does not mean that a credit card is not a method of 
payment similar to a check.  Moreover, plaintiffs do not suggest that, as with the billions in 
uncompensated care that results from the actions of the uninsured, co-payments and deductibles 
contribute in a similar manner to the spiraling costs of health care. 
 
7 These examples illustrate that the scope of the commerce power does not turn on whether a 
creative plaintiff can describe his own behavior as “active” or “passive.”  And for good reason; 
such a standard would be arbitrary and unworkable, as courts would have to determine when 
“passivity” ends and “activity” begins.   
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the failure to do so would impose costs on other market participants.  Under the National Flood 
Insurance Program, for example, an owner of property—including an owner of a residence or 
other non-commercial property—in a flood hazard area must obtain flood insurance in order to 
be permitted to obtain a mortgage or other secured loan from any regulated financial institution.  
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a), (b), (e).  Similarly, interstate motor carriers must obtain liability insurance 
in order to ensure that the carriers do not shift the financial burden to other parties for any 
accidents they may cause.8
Congressional authority to protect interstate commerce, both by prohibiting and requiring 
conduct, has also been found in the context of environmental regulation.  Under the Superfund 
Act, or CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., “covered persons,” including property owners 
(whether or not they are engaged in commercial activity), are deemed to be responsible for 
environmental damage from the release of hazardous substances, even if an owner simply 
permitted waste to leak on to his property “passive[ly],” “without any active human 
participation.”  Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992). 
  49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1).   
Nor is this Congressional power a recent creation. To the contrary, Congress has used 
similar powers for more than a century.  For example, it has long been understood that Congress 
may exercise the power of eminent domain—that is, the power to compel an otherwise “passive” 
private party to enter into a transaction—in furtherance of its enumerated powers, including its 
                                                          
8 These are not isolated examples.  Congress routinely requires market participants to obtain 
insurance to prevent them from imposing costs on other parties.  See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1) 
(sellers of anti-terrorism technology); 16 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(4) (entities operating in national 
marine sanctuary); 30 U.S.C. § 1257(f) (surface coal mining and reclamation operators); 42 
U.S.C. § 2210(a) (operators of nuclear power plants); 42 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(1) (uranium 
enrichment facility operators); 42 U.S.C. § 2458c(b)(2)(A) (aerospace vehicle developers); 45 
U.S.C. § 358(a) (railroad unemployment insurance). 
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Commerce Clause authority.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Luxton v. North 
River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1894) (collecting cases). 
The minimum coverage provision similarly effectuates Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.  The ACA regulates a class of individuals who almost certainly have participated, and 
will participate, in the health care market, who have decided to finance that participation in one 
frequently unsuccessful way, and whose economic activities impose substantial costs on other 
participants in that market.  Despite any claim by plaintiffs that the subjects of the minimum 
coverage provision stand apart from the health care market, their economic actions have a 
substantial effect on the larger market for health care services.  That empowers Congress to 
regulate. 
Plaintiffs’ slippery-slope arguments ignore the factors unique to the health care market 
that distinguish the exercise of Congress’s commerce power in that context.  Plaintiffs suggest 
that, if the minimum coverage provision were deemed constitutional, then Congress could 
mandate that individuals “buy a gym membership, maintain a specific body weight, or eat a 
healthier diet.”  Opp. at 18.  Putting aside questions whether these hypotheticals are plausible or 
implicate other constitutional provisions, such policies, unlike the minimum coverage provision, 
would not merely regulate the method of payment for services that necessarily will be rendered.  
Moreover, to contend that the subject of regulation has substantial effects on interstate commerce 
would require a chain of inferences—for example, that obese people use more health care; that 
increased demand for health care raises costs; that those costs fall on people who are not obese or 
on the interstate market generally; that Weight Watchers programs substantially reduce costs; 
and so on.  Here, Congress found that the effects of being uninsured are direct—people who do 
not have insurance incur billions in health care costs for which they do not pay.  Congress did 
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not need to “pile inference upon inference” to link the regulated activity and interstate 
commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
Nor is plaintiffs’ argument correct that upholding the ACA would empower Congress to 
mandate the purchase of a car.  Opp. at 28-29.  In the health care market, not only does everyone 
ultimately use medical services, but health care providers are required to treat them, whether or 
not they can pay.  Not everyone inevitably will appear on the doorstep of a car dealership, and if 
they do appear, they are not entitled to a new car if they cannot pay for it.  Unlike the uninsured 
in the health care market, they will not shift their costs to other participants in the market for 
automobiles.  In any event, the closer analogy to the minimum coverage provision is not a 
mandate to buy a car, but a regulation of how the purchase is financed.  Congress has authority to 
enact that regulation, and it has authority to enact this one. 
 B.  The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Valid Under the Necessary and   
  Proper Clause 
 
 As explained in defendants’ opening brief, the minimum coverage provision is also a 
valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Mem. in Supp. of 
Mot. to Dismiss at 23-24.  Indeed, Congress made express findings that the minimum coverage 
provision is in various ways “essential to creating [the] effective health insurance markets” that 
the ACA’s insurance market reforms are intended to achieve.  Pub. L. No. 111-148 §§ 
1501(a)(2)(H)-(J), 10106(a).   
 Plaintiffs do not deny that Congress may regulate the health insurance industry under the 
Commerce Clause.  See S.E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 553.  But they fail to appreciate what that 
means.  In S.E. Underwriters, the Supreme Court held that the antitrust prohibitions of the 
Sherman Act applied to fire insurance companies, and in so holding, explained that Congress’s 
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goal in the Sherman Act was to “restrain[] trust and monopoly agreements” in order to make “a 
competitive business economy.”  Id. at 558-59.  
 Congress’s enactment of the ACA, including the minimum coverage provision, is no 
different, in the sense that once again Congress sought to address a market crisis, this time in the 
health care and health insurance markets.  The ACA’s reforms are intended to increase the 
availability and affordability of health care and health insurance by, for example, preventing 
insurance companies from raising rates or denying coverage based on pre-existing medical 
conditions.  It was also intended to protect consumers from unfair insurance industry practices.  
These goals are indisputably within Congress’s commerce power, and plaintiffs do not contend 
otherwise.  Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the question is therefore whether the 
minimum coverage provision is “reasonably adapted” to further that legitimate end.   Sabri v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819).  As discussed in defendants’ opening brief, Congress deemed the minimum coverage 
provision not only reasonably adapted but “essential” to achieving the key reforms that it 
adopted in the ACA because without the provision, the limitations that other parts of the Act 
place on insurance companies would create new incentives for healthy individuals to forgo 
insurance coverage until after they require health care, knowing that, because of those other 
reforms, they could not be denied coverage or charged higher rates once their health care needs 
arise.  See supra at 10. 
 Plaintiffs argue that the “five considerations” listed by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010), weigh against the provision’s validity under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  However, the Court in Comstock did not list these 
considerations as a “test” that must in every instance be satisfied.  See id.  To the contrary, far 
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from overruling sub silentio nearly 200 years of jurisprudence, Comstock affirmed the Court’s 
long-standing application of “means-end” rationality review in the Necessary and Proper Clause 
context.  Id. at 1956-57.  The five considerations listed in Comstock represented the reasons that, 
in that particular case, the Court determined that the provision at issue was reasonably adapted to 
a legitimate end and have no automatic application here.  
 As set forth in defendants’ opening brief, Congress in the ACA pursued the same goals—
health care affordability and availability—that it had previously pursued for decades through 
legislation such as Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA, and numerous other 
measures.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 20 n.9.  Congress had “sound reasons” for 
doing so, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965, and for including the minimum coverage provision as an 
essential part of its insurance market reforms.  Thus, the provision is reasonably adapted in 
furtherance of a legitimate legislative end, and is therefore valid under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
 C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Independently Justified Under the  
  General Welfare Clause 
 
  1. The Regulatory Effect of the Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not  
   Remove It from the Reach of the General Welfare Clause 
 
 In addition to its authority under the Commerce Clause, Congress’s passage of the 
minimum coverage provision is also justified by its authority under the General Welfare Clause.  
Plaintiffs raise several objections to this conclusion that are without merit.  First, plaintiffs 
contend that, because Congress did not specifically invoke the General Welfare Clause in 
enacting the minimum coverage provision, instead making findings about its effect on 
commerce, the provision may not now be upheld on that basis.  Opp. at 29, 30.  To begin, 
plaintiffs’ assertion rests on an incorrect assumption, as “[t]he question of the constitutionality of 
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action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to 
exercise.”  Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).   
 In any event, that Congress made findings relating to the Commerce Clause in no way 
suggests that the minimum coverage provision was not also an exercise of authority under the 
General Welfare Clause.  Cf. Network Project v. Corp. for Pub. Broad., 561 F.2d 963, 969 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (recognizing that the Public Broadcasting Act could be justified under both the 
Commerce and General Welfare Clauses).  Indeed, it is not surprising that Congress would make 
findings relating to the Commerce Clause, but not the General Welfare Clause.  The effect of a 
statute on interstate commerce is partly an empirical determination, as to which legislative 
findings may be helpful.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 21.  Whether the statute furthers the general 
welfare, by contrast, is a policy judgment committed to Congress, as to which findings, 
particularly in this instance, are unnecessary. 
 Plaintiffs next assert that the minimum coverage provision cannot be considered a “tax” 
because it is referred to as a “penalty” in the ACA.9
                                                          
9 As noted by the bipartisan Joint Committee on Taxation, the penalty under the minimum 
coverage provision is “assessed through the Code and accounted for as an additional amount of 
Federal tax owed,” JCX-18-10, at 33, pursuant to “IRS authority to assess and collect taxes . . . 
generally provided in subtitle F, ‘Procedure and Administration’ in the Code.”  Id. at 33 n.68. 
  Opp. at 31.  Plaintiffs hedge on this 
argument in the same paragraph in which they introduce it, however, suggesting that “the 
‘practical operation’ of a provision is more informative than ‘the precise form of descriptive 
words which may be applied to it.’”  Opp. at 31 (citing Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 
U.S. 359, 363 (1941)).  The actual holding by the Supreme Court in Nelson is decidedly 
unhelpful to plaintiffs—that in “passing on the constitutionality of a tax law [the Court is] 
concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive 
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words which may be applied to it.”  Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument is plainly without merit.10
 Finally, plaintiffs argue that because the minimum coverage provision is “primarily 
regulatory in nature” rather than “in the nature of a true tax,” it falls outside of Congress’s 
authority under the General Welfare Clause.  Opp. at 32.  In other words, plaintiffs would have 
this Court return to pre-New Deal case law which turned on whether a tax was regulatory or 
revenue-raising in nature.  See, e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).  But the 
Supreme Court has long since “abandoned” its earlier “distinctions between regulatory and 
revenue-raising taxes” that it used to invalidate child labor laws.
 
11
 Even if those earlier cases had any lingering validity, they would not bring the 
constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision into question.  At most, they suggested that 
  Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 
741 n.12; see, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974) (“[E]ven 
if the revenue collected had been insubstantial, or the revenue purpose only secondary, we would 
not necessarily treat this exaction as anything but a tax * * *”) (internal citations omitted); Minor 
v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969) (“A statute does not cease to be a valid tax measure 
because it deters the activity taxed, because the revenue obtained is negligible, or because the 
activity is otherwise illegal.”); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (“It is beyond 
serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or 
even definitely deters the activities taxed”).  
                                                          
10 Plaintiffs also suggest that Congress’s declaration about which enforcement measures may be 
used in collecting the penalty is somehow relevant to whether it is a tax in the first place.  Opp. at 
32.  However, plaintiffs’ citation to the fact that Congress, in devising the minimum coverage 
provision, saw fit to analyze the specific enforcement mechanisms that would be used following 
the collection of the penalty emphasizes its nature as a tax. 
 
11 Plaintiffs disagree with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bob Jones of its own holding in 
Sonzinsky.  Opp. at 33 n.17.  Even if plaintiffs were allowed to overrule the Supreme Court, their 
alternative reading is inconsistent with the long line of cases cited above.   
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a court may invalidate punitive or coercive penalties, and even then, only those penalties that 
coerce the taxpayer into a separate administrative scheme with detailed enforcement mechanisms 
not allowable under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38; Hill 
v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289 (1936). 
Here, the minimum coverage provision is neither punitive nor coercive; the maximum penalty is 
no greater than the cost of obtaining insurance.  Moreover, the penalty under the minimum 
coverage provision does not operate coercively to force individuals into a separate regulatory 
regime.  The regulatory effect is from the operation of the provision itself. 
  2. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Not a Direct or Capitation Tax 
 Plaintiffs assert, in the alternative, that if the minimum coverage provision is justified 
under the General Welfare Clause, it constitutes an unconstitutional direct or capitation tax.  This 
is an extraordinary challenge, as such taxes are exceedingly rare, and the Supreme Court has 
expressly cautioned not to expand upon the historical understanding of these categories.  See 
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.); Murphy v. 
IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting opinion).  That understanding recognizes only 
three types of direct taxes: (1) a capitation tax, (2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon 
personal property.  Murphy, 493 F.3d at 181. 
 Of course the minimum coverage provision is not a capitation tax, which is one imposed 
“simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.”  Hylton, 3 U.S. at 
175 (opinion of Chase, J.); see also Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 443, 444 (1868) (adopting 
Justice Chase’s definition).  Even plaintiffs cannot plausibly assert otherwise, as they have now 
defaulted to arguing in a footnote that the provision “has key aspects of a capitation tax,” rather 
than that it is a capitation tax.  Opp. at 35 n.19 (emphasis added).  However, even that qualified 
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characterization is wrong, as plaintiffs’ assertion that “many Americans will end up having to 
pay simply because they exist,” ignores multiple aspects of the Act, including its exemptions, its 
evaluation of personal income to determine payment amounts, and, above all else, the fact that 
people pay nothing if they have qualifying insurance.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 
34. 
 Thus, plaintiffs are left with the argument that the provision is a direct tax upon real or 
personal property.  Plaintiffs cannot shoehorn the minimum coverage provision into these 
traditional categories, and therefore assert that the categories should be expanded to include the 
provision because it “penalizes individuals because they ‘are ‘there’’ and have not taken the 
affirmative step of buying health insurance.”  Opp. at 35 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs’ 
characterization is important because it demonstrates their recognition that the provision is not 
tied to the value of any property held by a non-exempted individual, and instead imposes a 
penalty on the choice of a method to finance the future costs of one’s health care.  See Mem. in 
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 33.  This choice is far much more “active” than the one at issue in 
Murphy, where the D.C. Circuit held that even a tax on the “involuntary conversion” of an 
individual’s human capital for money would not be a direct tax, despite the fact that the 
individual had no choice but to engage in that transaction.  493 F.3d at 185; see also 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 6651 (penalizing the failure to file a return or to pay taxes when due); 2001 (taxing the estate 
of the deceased); 4942 (taxing private foundations that fail to distribute a sufficient proportion of 
their income). 
 D. The Allegations of Plaintiffs Mead, Lee, and Seven-Sky Are Insufficient to  
  State a Claim Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 
 
 Plaintiffs’ Opposition gives short shrift to their as-applied RFRA claims, arguing that he 
minimum coverage provision violates RFRA by requiring plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky and Lee to 
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“choose between adhering to their religious beliefs about relying on God for their continued 
health and well-being and paying significant penalties to the government.”  Opp. at 36.  This 
characterization misstates the actual allegations of the Amended Complaint, where each plaintiff 
states that he or she holds the sincere religious belief that “God will provide for [plaintiffs’] 
physical, spiritual and financial well-being.”  See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 29, 43.  Nothing in the 
operation of the minimum coverage provision compels plaintiffs to change this belief; they can 
purchase health insurance or pay the penalty (if they are not exempted from doing so) and still 
maintain this religious conviction.  Plaintiffs instead allege that the purchase of health insurance 
(or the payment of a penalty) requires plaintiffs to take action that “conflicts” with this belief.  
See Opp. at 37.  That is a significant characterization, as the mere fact that government action 
“conflicts” with religious belief does not establish a claim under RFRA, as such a conflict does 
not demonstrate a substantial burden on belief.  See, e.g., Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 
680 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 Even if plaintiffs’ allegations of a religious “conflict” were sufficient to state a claim 
under RFRA, it is entirely uncertain whether plaintiffs will even be required to comply with the 
minimum coverage requirement in the first instance, as they have not alleged that their sincerely-
held religious beliefs prevent them from joining an entity that falls within one of the minimum 
coverage provision’s religious exemptions.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 35-36.  
Plaintiffs state that they “have no reason to anticipate . . . finding a health care sharing ministry 
eligible for an exemption whose religious tenets match their own,” and that they “object to being 
forced by the government to join a health insurance system against their will.”  Opp. at 38 n.21.  
However, that plaintiffs refuse to seek a religious exemption and “object” to doing so, does not 
establish that the exemption is somehow insufficient to accommodate plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, 
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particularly when plaintiffs do not allege that their newly-stated “objection” is religious in 
nature.12
 Finally, plaintiffs fail to respond to defendants’ argument in the Motion to Dismiss 
regarding the absence of any allegation that plaintiffs’ beliefs concerning health insurance are an 
important part of their religious scheme.  See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072, 1074 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678.  Apparently, plaintiffs are not members of any 
particular religious sect with a focus on methods of healing, such as Christian Scientists.  See 
Opp. at 37 n.20.  Thus, there is no indication in the Amended Complaint that being required to 
purchase health insurance implicates an important part of plaintiffs’ religion such that it imposes 
a substantial burden on belief.  After all, plaintiffs do not dispute that they routinely pay, and 
have paid, taxes that support numerous federal health insurance programs, including Medicare, 
apparently without objection.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 37.  Plaintiffs’ 
participation in these programs, like the minimum coverage provision, does not substantially 
burden their sincerely-held religious beliefs.
   
13
                                                          
12  Plaintiffs may, of course, also qualify for one of the other exemptions in the Act, such as that 
for individuals who cannot afford coverage or suffer a financial hardship.  See Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)). 
 
 
13 In light of the scant attention paid by plaintiffs to their RFRA claims, defendants believe it 
unnecessary to reassert the government’s compelling interests.  But here, too, plaintiffs’ 
assertions are misguided.  Plaintiffs first argue that defendants have not demonstrated a 
compelling interest relative to “the particular claimant” in the case.  Opp. at 38.  However, that 
assertion ignores the fact that providing an exemption to all individuals who, like plaintiffs, 
assert a generalized religious objection to the purchase of health insurance would render 
achievement of the policy objective impossible.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 40.  
Moreover, plaintiffs ignore defendants’ proffer that the minimum coverage provision’s 
objectives—including promoting the public health—are the compelling government interest at 
stake in this litigation.  See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 39.  In fact, the correlation 
between United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and its progeny and a mandatory system of 
health insurance has already been drawn by the Ninth Circuit in Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 
1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997).  Despite plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Goehring, the fact remains that the plaintiffs in 




For the reasons stated, the government’s motion to dismiss should be granted. 
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Goehring “allege[d] that the University’s mandatory student registration fee violates their right 
to free exercise of religion because the fee is used, in part, to subsidize the University’s health 
insurance program, which covers abortion services.”  Id. at 1297.  Defendants, of course, do not 
rely on the “substantial burden” portion of the decision in Goehring that has since been 
superseded by statute—a basis for the decision separate and apart from the compelling interest 
analysis.  See id. at 1299-1300.    
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 23    Filed 09/24/10   Page 32 of 33
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I hereby certify that on September 24, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Reply to be served on Plaintiffs’ counsel electronically by means of the Court’s ECF 
system. 
 
         /s/ Eric R. Womack                                
       ERIC R. WOMACK 
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 23    Filed 09/24/10   Page 33 of 33
